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“….there is diversity in conduct in situations involving uncertainty due to differences 
in the amount of confidence which individuals feel in their judgments….this degree of 
confidence is in large measure independent of the “true value” of the judgments and 
powers themselves” 
 
Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, 1921 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Young men are more likely to be involved in serious motoring accidents than young 
women. Were gender dependent premiums illegal, the standard Stiglitz and 
Rothschild (1976) model of insurance, in which all that differs between people is their 
expected loss, implies that males will be more likely to purchase comprehensive 
insurance. Yet this prediction of a positive correlation between insurance cover and 
accident rates is questionable.1 Young males are more risk tolerant, hence less 
inclined to insure. They also tend to be excessively confident of their driving ability, 
leading to reckless behavior but blinding them to the benefits of insurance. Men may 
therefore choose lower cover than women, despite being more accident prone. That is, 
selection is advantageous not adverse.2 
 
If diverse beliefs do partially explain who buys insurance, this strengthens the case for 
paternalistic interventions such as requiring comprehensive insurance. 
 
This paper measures optimism as forecast error in whether an experimental task is 
successfully completed and finds it is correlated with travel insurance purchase, 
suggesting intrinsic optimism matters for insurance decisions. 
 
                                                 
1
 This property is formally derived by Chiappori, Julien, Salanie and Salanie (2006). Studies failing to 
find evidence of adverse selection include Chiappori and Salanie (2000) Dionne, Gourieroux and 
Vanasse (2001) for motoring insurance. Advantageous selection, is found by Cawley and Philipson 
(1999) and McCarthy and Mitchell (2003) for life insurance, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) for long-
term health-care cover, Hurd and McGarry (1997), Ettner (1997), Fang et al. (2008) for Medigap 
insurance, Huang, Tzeng and Wang (2006) for fire insurance and Davidoff and Welke (2005) for 
reverse mortgages.  
2
 Hemenway (1990) coined the term “propitious selection”. The reason the CJSS result excludes 
advantageous selection is that imperfect competition, costly claim processing and irrational 
expectations are disallowed (see de Meza and Webb (2001) and Koufopoulos (2007)). Theoretical 
studies of the selection effects of optimism in various contexts  include Brown (1974 ) de Meza and 
Southey (1996) ,Van den Steen (2004), Spinnewijn (2008). 
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2. The Model 
 
People differ in their probability of suffering a fixed monetary loss. Willingness to 
pay (wtp) for insurance is therefore )),(,( iiii ZtRprobWwtp = , 0,0 >< Rprob WW , 
where iprob  is i’s subjective assessment of the probability of avoiding loss, iR  is a 
risk aversion parameter, t a shift parameter and Z a vector of other variables. If the 
true probability of avoiding loss is *iprob , optimism is 
),)(( ** iiiii probstgOprobprob +=−  where g is a “genetic” component, a bias that 
carries across settings, and s is a random, situation-specific, evaluation error.3 The 
reason *iprob  appears in the optimism function is that when the true probability of 
success is high, the scope for overestimation is low. Specifically, optimism could be 
interpreted as mistakenly assigning fail states as successes. For example, if the 
proportion of mistakes were constant, then )1( *iprobO −= α . More generally, 
01 * <<− probO . 
 
The cross-section relationship between insurance and optimism depends on the nature 
of individual heterogeneity. If the only source of variation is the true probability of 
success, 
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Insurance buyers are those with low objective chances of success and they are the 
most optimistic (leading to a positive correlation property as in Rothschild and 
Stiglitz). In contrast, if the only factor determining who buys insurance is 
idiosyncratic expectation error, then in a cross section, 
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                                           (2) 
Insurance buyers are less optimistic about their chance of loss than the uninsured and 
some people with high chance of loss are uninsured due to false confidence. Equation 
                                                 
3
 What matters for the analysis is heterogeneous forecast error so pessimism is in principle possible. 
Optimism is though the dominant psychological finding (De Bondt and Thaler (1995, p. 389)). 
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3 shows this continues to be true if the genetic factor, t, that raises optimism does not 
increase risk aversion, as is plausible.4  
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So if people differ enough in their psychology, or random evaluation errors are 
sufficiently important, it will be the uninsured rather than the insured that are most 
optimistic, weakening the link between insurance and loss propensity. 
 
As *iprob  is not directly observable, there is the question how to test these 
implications. Define iii DprobB −= , where iD is a dummy for whether i does 
actually succeed. According to rational expectations, 0)( =iBE . A test of whether 
optimism unrelated to *prob  plays a role in choices is whether B is significantly 
higher for the insured. Because the outcome variable is binary, B is never zero (even 
if expectations are rational) so standard errors will be high, making this a stringent 
test. 
 
If dispositional optimism is present it will apply in different forecasting situations. 
People choosing insurance against some specific loss will tend to have below average 
optimism in other settings. 
3. The Experiment 
 
(i) Method 
 
Each subject was assigned a task at which they could succeed or fail. They made two 
sets of nine choices then undertook the task. At the end of the experiment, one of the 
18 questions was selected at random and the subject’s winnings were calculated 
according to his/her choice on that question. 
 
The first set of nine questions are designed to measure subjective (implicit) 
expectation of success. Subjects choose between winning a prize for succeeding in the 
                                                 
4
 The risk-aversion effect means a given wtp is achieved at a lower level of optimism so it is 
ambiguous whether the difference in optimism between insured and uninsured increases. 
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skill-based task or winning the same prize by means of a binary lottery with specified 
winning probability. Questions differ only in the (increasing) probability of winning 
the lottery. As just one question is randomly chosen for reward, each should be 
answered as if it were the sole question asked. Given the prize is the same for both 
options, expected-utility theory implies that, irrespective of risk preferences, the 
probability at which a subject switches to the lottery puts bounds on their subjective 
estimate of success in the skill based task. This is a version of the mechanism 
described by Karni (2009). 
 
A possible objection to this procedure for the elicitation of expectations is that 
subjects may obtain utility from winning by means of their own efforts. Also, 
rejecting the lottery means never discovering whether it would have yielded more, 
eliminating regret. Both these effects imply that the switch point in these questions 
exceeds the subjective success probability. Finally, ambiguity aversion may mean that 
there is a preference for the lottery. 
 
To provide an alternative measure of expectations, subjects made a direct (explicit) 
but unmotivated estimate of their probability of winning. In what follows we take 
expected success, prob, as the mean of these two expectations measures, but results 
are similar whichever measure is used. 
 
In the second set of nine questions, subjects choose between a sure payment and a 
higher prize for succeeding in the assigned task. There is no payment for failure. 
Depending on the task, the prize for success increases across the questions or the safe 
payment does. The point at which the subject switches from the safe option represents 
their wtp to insure against failure in the experimental task. 
 
(ii) The Tasks 
 
Three tasks were conducted face-to-face by the experimenter. “Frazzle” is a game that 
requires a steady hand. Subjects must guide a loop round a wire course. If the loop 
touches the wire, a buzzer sounds. For one group of subjects winning required never 
triggering a buzz. This is “Frazzle 0”. “Frazzle 1” allows at most one touch. The third 
challenge was “Timing”, which involves counting down two minutes with an 
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accuracy of at least ten seconds. In all the face-to-face tasks the probability elicitation 
prize was £8 and in the second set of questions the safe option was £4 and the prize 
for success varied from £5 to £13. Eighty five student subjects from a variety of 
London School of Economics degree courses were each presented with one of these 
tasks. 
 
Another task was undertaken in class. Two glass jars were circulated in a first year 
management class of 56 students. One jar was identified as containing 151 pennies. 
The task was to estimate how many pennies the second jar contained. Success is an 
estimate within 15% plus or minus of the true number, 540. For the preference 
elicitation questions the prize was £200. In the second set of questions it was the safe 
payment that varied, from £20 to £180, with the prize for winning always £200. 
 
(iii) Results 
 
Table 1 reports on overall optimism. As measured by the motivated measure (implicit  
forecast), the mean expected success probability is 0.49, but there is considerable 
variation, with standard deviation 0.2. The mean direct forecast (explicit forecast) is 
0.5 with standard deviation 0.23. In contrast to the relatively high expectations of 
success, only 26% of the subjects actually succeeded in the task. Applying a t test to 
the (noisy) measure B, the experimental data reveals overall optimism, significant at 
the 0.1% level. 
 
Table 1: Subjective expectations of success and actual performance 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
 
 Frazzle 0 
(n=24) 
Frazzle1 
(n=23) 
Timing 
(n=38) 
Pennies 
(n=56) 
All 
(n=141) 
Success rate 0.13 
(0.34) 
0.35 
(0.49) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.23 
(0.43) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
Implicit 
forecast 
0.41 
(0.20) 
0.5 
(0.19) 
0.56 
(0.20) 
0.48 
(0.20) 
0.49 
(0.20) 
Explicit 
Forecast 
0.34 
(0.20) 
0.42 
(0.18) 
0.57 
(0.17) 
0.54 
(0.26) 
0.50 
(0.23) 
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Travel insurance is amongst the better insurance buys in terms of its payback rate5. 
Subjects not purchasing it might be conjectured to be optimists. The first column of 
Table 2 is a regression of expectation of success in the experimental task on a dummy 
variable equal to one for the 81 subjects reporting that they normally buy travel 
insurance.6 Task dummies are also included. Even though the tasks are unrelated to 
travel, the insured have significantly lower expectations of succeeding in them. This 
does not prove that the insured are more realistic. They may be less likely to succeed, 
though this does not turn out to be the case. The second column reports a regression 
of success in the task on the purchase of travel insurance. It can be ruled out at the 5% 
level that holders of travel insurance are less likely to succeed. Column 3 confirms 
this. Optimism as measured by B is significantly lower for those with travel insurance. 
 
Table 2: Relative optimism of travel insured subjects 
 Prob Success Optimism 
Travel Insurance -0.085*** 
(-2.67) 
0.13* 
(1.80) 
-0.22*** 
(-2.72) 
 R2 =0.16 
n=135 
R2 =0.06 
n=135 
R2 =0.08 
n=135 
Prob is the mean of the implicit and explicit forecast of success. Success is a dummy equal to one if the 
task is completed. Optimism is prob-success. In all tables, ***means significantly above zero at the 1% 
level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level (using robust standard errors) and all equations include task 
dummies. Only 135 subjects answered the travel insurance question.  
 
Willingness to insure the experimental payoff is in principle measured by the switch 
point in the second set of questions. In the pennies task, the safe payment varies, but 
in the other tasks it is the prize for success that differs between questions. Hence, the 
ordering (and magnitudes) of the switch points differ. Dummies do not correct for 
this. Instead, subjects are grouped according to relative willingness to take the safe 
option. The highinsure dummy identifies the 19 out of 55 pennies subjects keenest to 
                                                 
5
 The ratio of claims paid to premium income is 67% for travel insurance compared to 78% for motor 
insurance and 54% for home insurance. 
http://www.lovemoney.com/news/insurance/insurance/1069/insurances-that-rip-you-off (retrieved 
03/09/2011) 
 
6
 Personal characteristics are deliberately excluded from this equation. Suppose, for example, that 
relative to men, women have higher success rates, the same expectations but are more likely to buy 
insurance. Controlling for gender it might then be found that the insured are no more realistic. This 
though hides the fact that as hypothesised, insurance attract relatively realistic types, in this example 
women. If gender is used to price insurance then it would be relevant to include it. In practice for many 
kinds of insurance it may be illegal to set premiums according to gender. Our results are though similar 
if gender, age and nationality controls are used. 
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take the safe option (switch point £50 and below) and the 21 out of 85 subjects in the 
face-to-face experiments keenest to take the safe option (switch point of £10.5 and 
above). At the other extreme, lowinsure comprises the 10 pennies subjects with 
switchpoint of £110 and above and 17 face-to-face subjects with switchpoint £6.5 and 
below. 
 
The first column of Table 3 shows that prob is highly significant in explaining 
whether people take insurance when premiums are high and the second when they are 
low. This is consistent with standard theory.7 In column 3, the slope coefficient of a 
regression of success on prob  is positive but not significant and little of the variation 
is explained. So there is limited evidence of rational expectations. More importantly, 
the slope coefficient is significantly below unity at the 1% level. So low expectations 
are associated with both realism and insurance. 
 
Table 3 Experimental Insurance Choices 
 Highinsure lowinsure Success 
Prob -0.98*** 
(-6.09) 
1.04*** 
(6.16) 
0.25▪▪▪ 
(1.23) 
 R2 =0.3 
n= 140 
R2 =0.28 
n= 140 
R2 =0.04 
n= 140 
Highinsure is a dummy for subjects with the greatest preference for the safe option and lowinsure is a 
dummy for subjects with the lowest preference for the safe option. ▪▪▪ means significantly below unity 
at the 1% level. One subject made inconsistent choices in the second set of questions and was dropped.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 For the pennies task there was an independent measure of risk preference, which was highly 
significant in explaining insurance purchase. 
 9
Table 4: Relative optimism by WTP for task insurance 
 Prob Success Optimism 
Highinsure -0.33*** 
(-7.63) 
-0.04 
(-0.33) 
-0.29** 
(-2.36) 
Middleinsure -0.19*** 
(-6.06) 
 
-0.07 
(-0.7) 
-0.12 
(-1.12) 
 R2 =0.42 
n=140 
R2 =0.03 
N=140 
R2 =0.06 
n=140 
Prob is the mean of the implicit and explicit forecast of success. Success is a dummy equal to one if the 
task is completed. Optimism is prob-success. Highinsure is a dummy for subjects with the greatest 
preference for the safe option and middleinsure is a dummy for subjects who are neither lowinsure nor 
highinsure.. 
 
Table 4 reports more directly on the role of optimism on experimental insurance. 
According to the first column, subjects keenest to buy insurance have very 
substantially higher expectations of loss relative to those with the lowest willingness 
to pay (middleinsure is a dummy for those not lowinsure or highinsure). As shown by 
the second column, there is no significant difference in success rates by level of 
insurance,  so there is no evidence of adverse selection. The final column of Table 4 
indicates that high demand for insurance is associated with significantly lower 
optimism than is low demand. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Empirical studies report mixed results on whether losses are increasing in insurance 
cover-the "positive correlation" property. As selection into insurance is plausibly 
based on many factors, not just expected loss, it is not surprising that adverse 
selection is sometimes weak or absent. If beliefs are not well correlated with true loss 
probabilities, this further undermines adverse selection. This experiment does indeed 
find that people who think they are more likely to suffer loss are more likely to insure, 
but beliefs are not well founded, tending to eliminate adverse selection. Most 
strikingly, buyers of travel insurance overestimate their chance of succeeding in 
experimental tasks unrelated to travel by less than non buyers, indicating dispositional 
optimism is a factor in insurance choice. 
 
 10
Diverse beliefs could reverse adverse selection, for example if expectations and 
success are negatively correlated. A more plausible channel by which advantageous 
selection can arise is if beliefs impact on moral hazard, as in the driving example. The 
experimental tasks here have limited opportunities for such effects, so it is not 
surprising that advantageous selection does no more than mute adverse selection. This 
is not to say that optimism is good for welfare. Using the coefficient on expectations 
in the insurance demand equation of column 1, Table 3, the effect of lowering 
expected success by the mean level of optimism is to raise the overall probability of 
choosing insurance at the high premium from to 28% to 51%.  
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